This paper examines the role played by biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies. A bio-economic model is developed with a dynamic and multiscale perspective. It combines biodiversity dynamics, farming land-uses selected at the micro level and public policies at the macro level based on financial incentives for land-uses. The public decision-maker identifies optimal subsidies or taxes with respect to both biodiversity and budgetary constraints. These optimal policies are then analyzed through their private, public and social costs. The model is calibrated and applied to metropolitan France at the Small Agricultural Region (SAR) scale using common birds as biodiversity metrics. First results relying on optimality curves and private costs stress the bio-economic trade-off between biodiversity and economic scores. By contrast, the analysis of public costs suggests that accounting for biodiversity can generate a second benefit in terms of public budget. Social costs defined as the sum of private and public costs also show possible bio-economic synergies.
Introduction
In many European countries, a strong decline in biodiversity is observable in agricultural landscapes (Flowerdew & Kirkwood 1997 , Sotherton & Self 2000 , Donald et al. 2001 . Numerous studies (Chamberlain et al. 2000 , Wretenberg et al. 2007 ) identify the changes in farming systems over the last decades and especially the intensification processes at play as major drivers of this erosion. Populations of breeding birds are particularly vulnerable to agricultural change , Krebs et al. 1999 . Such a negative effect is due mainly to a degradation in habitat quality altering nesting success and survival (Benton et al. 2003) . In this context, the European Union has formally adopted the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) as an indicator of structural changes in biodiversity in response to land-use changes (Balmford et al. 2003) .
A challenge to reach sustainability for agricultural land-use is therefore to reconcile farming production and farmland biodiversity. The approaches usually implemented to achieve such multifunctional goals for farming rely on public policies (Pacini et al. 2004 , Drechsler et al. 2007 , Mouysset et al. 2011a ). For Alavalapati et al. (2002) and Shi & Gill (2005) , financial incentives are essential for convincing farmers to adopt eco-friendly activities. These policies modify the farmer's choices and thus impact the habitat and the dynamics of biodiversity (Doherty et al. 1999 , Holzkämper & Seppelt 2007 , Rashford et al. 2008 . In this perspective, many public policies including agri-environmental schemes have been proposed by decision-makers. However, fifteen years after the initial implementation of such instruments at a large scale, their efficiency for enhancing biodiversity remains controversial (Butler et al. 2009 , Kleijn et al. 2006 , Vickery et al. 2004 ). These policies face a variety of difficulties.
From the ecological point of view, insufficient knowledge about the agroecological processes at play and the focus on a few emblematic species limit the results. From the economic point of view, the low level of acceptability by farmers constitutes a major obstacle for the effectiveness of these policies. In this context, assessing and comparing the different agricultural policy scenarios through quantitative methods and bio-economic models is useful. The CostBenefit method (Boardman et al. 2005) compares monetary costs and benefits of a policy. However, in view of the difficulties of quantifying biodiversity (Diamond & Hausman 1994) in financial terms, Cost-Effectiveness analysis appears as a relevant alternative. Based on optimization under constraints, it leads to defining either the least expensive policy satisfying a biodiversity goal or the policy with the best biodiversity performance under budgetary constraints (Naidoo et al. 2006) . Many authors (Drechsler et al. 2007 , Polasky et al. 2008 2005) using this approach for land-use policy have identified different possible trade-offs between ecological and economic objectives.
The objective of this paper is to contribute to accounting for biodiversity goals in the design of agricultural policies and, more specifically, to find possible synergies instead of trade-offs between biodiversity and economic performances. The paper extends the bio-economic modeling works of Mouysset et al. (2011a) by focusing on optimal public policies under different biodiversity constraints. More precisely, it is assumed that a public decision-maker identifies an optimal vector of land-use taxes/subsidies which maximizes the present value of the national income under different biodiversity targets and a budgetary constraint. The optimal policies are then analyzed through their private, public and social costs (Semaan et al. 2007) . By private cost is meant the loss due to biodiversity requirements of the farmers' income including transfers (taxes and subsidies) while the public cost stands for the public monetary balances of public policy. The social cost refers to the loss of the farmer's income without transfers. The study is based on a spatio-temporal bio-economic model applied to the metropolitan France case study. The calibration relies on a French time series of the abundance of 34 birds and 14 farming land-uses over the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] and 620 small agricultural regions (SAR) in metropolitan France. The ecological performance is captured by two biodiversity indicators: the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) which has been adopted by the European Union (Balmford et al. 2003) , and the Community Trophic Index (CTI) which informs on the functional state of the community (Mouysset et al. 2012 , Pauly et al. 1998 .
The first main contribution of the paper is to confirm the known tradeoff between biodiversity and economic scores in terms of optimality curve and private costs. The second major contribution is to show through public costs how the integration of biodiversity goals is not detrimental to the whole society in the sense that it can generate a benefit in terms of budget balance. The biodiversity-oriented policy thus yields a double benefit. In the same vein, it is pointed out through social (private plus public) costs how ecological-economic synergies and reconciliation may exist. In line with this, it is suggested that the redistribution of the induced earnings to the farmers could compensate their private loss and so increase their acceptance of high biodiversity objectives in the design of agricultural policies.
The bio-economic modeling
Illustrated by figure 1, the bio-economic model links public decision-making at the macro scale with land-use decisions of farmers, habitats and bird population dynamics at the micro scale.
The biodiversity model
The biodiversity model is based on the population dynamics of a community of species s = 1, . . . , n S with intra-specific competition 1 depending on habitat and especially on agricultural land-use in several regions r = 1, . . . , n R . A Beverton-Holt function 2 captures intra-specific competition through a time depending carrying capacity as follows:
where N s,r (t) stands for the abundance of species s in region r at year t. The coefficient R s,r corresponds to the intrinsic growth rate of species s in region r. The value M s,r (t) captures the ability of this habitat to host the species s in region r. The product M s,r (t) * R s,r is indeed the carrying capacity in the sense of the strictly positive equilibrium of the population dynamics. Moreover, the habitat value M s,r (t) is assumed to depend on different farming land-uses k = 1, . . . , n K (see Table 1 ) through the linear relation:
where L r,k (t) stands for the area of land-use k implemented in region r at time t. Consequently, the a s,r,k and b s,r coefficients, depending on each species, inform on how such species s responds to agricultural land-use k in region r. The b s,r coefficient can be interpreted as the mean habitat coefficient for species s in region r and integrates other land-uses such as forests or urban areas. The indicators used to assess ecological performance are computed from the abundances N s,r (t) of the species. We denote the biodiversity index by Biod without specifying it at this stage. Such a formulation may include usual biodiversity metrics such as species richness, Simpson or trophic indices. In each region, it is defined as follows:
The economic model
We consider a public decision-maker at the macro (typically national) scale interacting with regional farmers in a two stage model. In the first stage, the planner identifies the optimal incentive scheme in terms of taxes or subsidies related to different land-uses by maximizing the aggregate income of all regions under global budgetary and biodiversity constraints. In the second stage, the regional farmers make optimal land-use choices by maximizing their own rent. Although it is assumed that farmers do not directly account for biodiversity in their local decisions, their land-use is influenced by the public incentives which integrate the biodiversity objectives of the planner. The model is solved backward, beginning with stage two.
Each region r is assumed to be managed by a representative farmer. The aggregation of individual farmers of a given region into a representative farmer at the regional scale is justified by the assumption that the regions are characterized by an agro-economic homogeneity and consequently that the individual farmers within a region face similar environments and constraints. Both region and representative farmer are then associated with the index r. These representative farmers are heterogeneous since regions differ in terms of gross margin and initial allocation of land-uses. The income of representative regional farmer r at year t derives from the different agricultural land-uses k through the agricultural areas L r,k (t) implemented at time t, the expected gross margin per unit of scale denoted by gm r,k and public financial incentives denoted by τ k . These public incentives for each land-use k include subsidies with positive values τ k > 0 and taxes when τ k < 0. The income of farmer r at year t denoted by Π r (t) reads as follows:
For a given public incentive scheme τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , ..., τ n K ), it is assumed that the regional farmer selects each year t agricultural land-uses L r (t) = (L r,1 (t), L r,2 (t), .., L r,n K (t)) in order to maximize income Π r (t) given by (4) according to capital and rigidity constraints. This reads as follows:
4 under the constraints:
In this model, farmers follow a myopic behavior as in Péreau et al. (2012) , Sandal & Steinshamn (2004) . Constraint (6) restricts the area that the farmer can modify each year. Such rigidity can arise due to technological or behavioral reasons. This rigidity constraint reflects some delay in the adjustment process with respect to the optimal policy of farmers. The rate captures change costs or inertia. Hence, the speed of change refers to the necessary time for a farmer to adjust his land use and converge towards an optimal allocation. In other words, farmers with small have reduced capability to change each year. Constraint (7) states that the total agricultural area L r remains fixed in each region r. This maximization program is solved numerically and yields an implicit reaction function for land-uses L * r,k (t) depending on the values of the model, namely the incentive τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , ..., τ n K ), the gross margins gm r = (gm r,1 , gm r,2 , ..., gm r,n K ), the inertia parameter ε, the total area L r and the value of land-use L r (t − 1) in the previous period. Focusing on incentives and land-use, this implicit function can thus be written as:
In stage one, the public decision-maker acts as a leader of Stackelberg: he takes into account the reaction function (8) of each regional farmer when selecting the optimal vector of taxes and subsidies incentives τ k associated with land-use k. By taxing a land-use, the decision-maker decreases its profitability and stimulates the reduction of the area dedicated to this land-use for the benefit of more gainful land-uses. By contrast, a subsidy on a land-use, by increasing its profitability, promotes its enlargement at the expense of the less profitable ones. The incentives τ k designed by the decision-maker are defined at the national scale. However it is worth noting that the absolute impact of these incentives varies with the regions because they are built as percent of gross margins (eq. 4) which are heterogeneous among the regions. The intertemporal program of the decision maker is to maximize the Present Value of aggregate net farm Income P V I(τ ) discounted at the rate ρ from the first year of the projection t 1 to the final time horizon T :
under the reaction function (8) of the regional farmers, a biodiversity constraint (11) and a budgetary constraint (10):
Budgetary constraint (10) is related to the amounts spent and received by the public decision-maker for farming over the regions. This national balance is based on incentives τ as follows:
Budgetary constraint (10) ensures that the budget balance (spent subsidiesperceived taxes) for farming does not exceed the yearly public envelope Budg lim each year. In other words, the public decision-maker has a financial envelope 3 which he can share between the different land-uses according to its objectives, constraints and instruments. Because of this positive amount, a policy only based on subsidies is potentially feasible. If the decision-maker decides to implement taxes, tax products are added to the balance and can potentially be used to pay extra subsidies as compared to a case only with the initial envelope. The ecological requirement (eq. 11) is based on a conservation limit B lim for the biodiversity score introduced previously in equation (3) and depending on abundances of species. It is imposed only at the temporal horizon T . Different values of B lim can be tested and compared between the lowest value B lim = 0, where the constraint is not active, and the maximal feasible biodiversity 4 denoted by B * . The solution of the maximization problem (eq. 9) yields optimal incentives denoted by τ * (B lim ) which depend especially on biodiversity threshold B lim .
Private, public and social biodiversity costs
The public policies induce public and private costs both at micro and macro levels as proposed by Semaan et al. (2007) . Analysing such costs is helpful for evaluating the economic performances of the different policies for the entire society, including public and private agents.
The aggregated private cost is based on the loss of farmers' income (including public transfers) due to biodiversity requirements. The private cost, denoted by P rC(B lim ), is computed as the difference between the maximum feasible present value of aggregate net farm income P V I(τ * (0)) without any biodiversity target and the optimal present value P V I(τ * (B lim )) under biodiversity goal B lim :
By contrast, the public cost denoted by P uC(B lim ) evaluates the impact in terms of public balance of achieving particular biodiversity targets B lim . It is 3 Typically based on the current CAP budget as developed in section 3 4 This maximum B * is defined by a biodiversity maximization with respect to the vector of fiscal incentives and under the budgetary constraint:
6 the difference of the discounted sums of public monetary balances without and with biodiversity target. It depends on the biodiversity target B lim as the net public revenue is itself a function of the optimal incentives τ * (B lim ). The public aggregate cost reads as follows:
where Bal * (t, B lim ) stands for the budget evaluated for the optimal policy τ * (B lim ) in the following sense:
L * r,k (t, B lim ) means the optimal land-uses determined by the farmers according to equation (8) under the optimal policy τ * (B lim ). Defining as the sum of the private and public costs, the social cost SoC(B lim ) refers to the loss entailed by the biodiversity constraint of the farmer's income without transfers (taxes and subsidies). It measures the difference in terms of farming income between an optimal policy without any ecological constraint and an optimal environment-friendly policy:
The question whether these costs are positive or not is decisive for the acceptability of biodiversity requirements by farmers on one hand and by the whole society on the other hand, and thus for the adoption of eco-friendly agricultural policies.
3. The French case study
Context
This bio-economic modeling framework is applied to metropolitan France. France is split into n R = 620 small agricultural regions (SAR). A SAR is part of a department (a major French administrative entity) characterized by an agro-ecological homogeneity. This consistency from both the ecological and economic points of view makes the SAR a relevant regional scale for economic and biodiversity models. Ecological and economic data are available from 2001 to 2008 (t 0 ). The policy scenarios are tested between t 1 = 2009 and T = 2050. Selecting a shorter time frame could consequently hide interesting long-term effects due to the inertia of the model. As compared to Mouysset et al. (2011a) , the precision of the model has been reinforced thanks to a refined spatial scale (from regional to SAR) for every bio-economic data and a refinement of the classes used for the land-uses. In other words, the model better accounts for local particularities through the calibration process.
Biodiversity data
As regards biodiversity, we focus on common bird populations and related indicators (Gregory et al. 2004) . Although the metric and the characterization of biodiversity remain an open debate (MEA 2005) , such a choice is justified for several reasons (Ormerod & Watkinson 2000) : (i) Birds lie at a high level in the trophic food chains and thus capture variations in the chains. (ii) Birds provide many ecological services, such as the regulation of rodent populations and pest control, thus justifying our interest in their conservation (Sekercioglu et al. 2004) . (iii) Their close vicinity to humans makes them a simple and comprehensive example of biodiversity for a large audience of citizens.
The STOC (French Bird Breeding Survey) database 5 provides information related to the bird abundances across the whole country. Abundance values for each species are available 6 for the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . Among the species monitored by this large-scale long-term survey, we selected n S = 34 species which have been classified according to their habitat requirements at a European scale (European Bird Census Council 2007) . Table 2 lists the 14 habitat generalist species and the 20 farmland specialist species used as a reference by the European Union (Gregory et al. 2004 ).
Economic data
Agro-economic data arise from the French agro-economic classification OTEX (orientation technico-economique) developed by the French Farm Accounting Data Network (FADN) 7 and the Observatory of Rural Development (ODR) 8 . This agency distinguishes between n K = 14 classes of land-use named OTEX detailed in table 1. Each SAR is a specific combination of these OTEX. The areas dedicated to the 14 OTEX land-uses and the associated fiscal bases (tax return) used as proxies of gross margins for the years 2001 to 2008 are available on the ODR website upon private request. Gross margin is an economic index widely used in agricultural economics (Lien 2002) . The 14 land-uses can potentially be chosen by the representative farmers at the SAR scale and are taken into account in the computation of their regional income (eq. 4). They also impact the habitat variables involved in the ecological model (eq. 2).
To accelerate numerical computations, the public decision variables τ k are restricted to only two incentives: the "cereal" incentive τ cop is dedicated to arable lands (Otex (1) in table 1) and the "grassland" incentive τ grass is applied to non-intensive grassland systems (Otex (4), (5), (6), (7) in table 1). The 5 See the Vigie-Nature website http://www2.mnhn.fr/vigie-nature/. Standardized monitoring of spring-breeding birds at 1747 2 * 2 km 2 plots across the whole country. Details of the monitoring method and sampling design can be found in Jiguet (2009) .
6 For each species, a spatial interpolation of the abundance data is performed to obtain relative abundance values for each possible square in the country (Doxa et al. 2010) . We then average the abundance values at the SAR scale.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/ 8 https://esrcarto.supagro.inra.fr/intranet/ gross margins gm r,k are computed as the temporal mean of the historical gross margins:
The budgetary limit of constraint (10) 
Model calibration
The agro-ecological parameters R s,r , a s,r,k and b s,r introduced in equations (1)- (2) and the economic parameter of equation (6) are determined by a calibration based on a least square method. Hence, the gaps between the observed outputs and the outputs derived from the model are minimized. The considered outputs of the model are the land-use values L r,k (t) for the economic model and the bird abundances N s,r (t) for the ecological model, as detailed in Mouysset et al. (2013; 2011a) . The discount rate is set to ρ = 4%.
Biodiversity indicators
The biodiversity indicators used in this study are the Farmland Bird Index (FBI) and the Community Trophic Index (CTI), both evaluated in final year T = 2050. The Farmland Bird Index has been adopted by the European Community as the official environmental index, especially to analyze structural changes in biodiversity (Balmford et al. 2003) . The relevance of the FBI to reflect the response of farmland biodiversity to agricultural intensification has been shown in Doxa et al. (2010) and Mouysset et al. (2012) . We compute the FBI at the national scale with 20 farmland specialist species for each SAR:
where N s (t) = 620 r=1 N s,r (t) stands for the total abundance of species s over the n R = 620 regions.
The Community Trophic Index (CTI) informs on the average trophic level of a community as in Pauly et al. (1998) and Mouysset et al. (2012) . The CTI here integrates both the 14 generalist species and the 20 farmland specialist species (table 2) . At the regional level, it is computed as the arithmetic mean of the exponential of the species trophic level 9 STI s weighted by their relative abundances. National CTI is the arithmetic mean of the 620 regional CTI as follows:
where N tot,r = 34 s=1 N s,r (t) stands for the total abundance of birds in a region r. The exponential function is used to better contrast bird communities with high trophic levels as in Mouysset et al. (2012) . Figure 2 is a first illustration of the bio-economic performances. It displays the maximal present values P V I(τ * (B lim )) of aggregate net farm income as computed in (9) under different biodiversity constraints B lim (data available on row 1 of tables 3 and 4). The biodiversity metrics is the farmland bird index F BI on the top, in fig. 2(a) , while it is the trophic index CT I on the bottom, in fig. 2(b) . The red diamond corresponds to the optimal policy τ * (0) without biodiversity constraint in both cases. The green marks in fig. 2 (a) and 2(b) represent the present values of incomes for the policies τ * (F BI * ) and τ * (CT I * ) with the maximal biodiversity score. We observe that the two optimal curves both decrease with respect to biodiversity target B lim although the shapes differ. In particular, the curve obtained with the F BI in fig. 2 (a) mixes convex and concave decreasing parts. By contrast, the curve obtained with the CT I constraint in fig. 2(b) is characterized by a global concavity, especially strong for large biodiversity level B lim . Hence, the increase of the CT I target has a limited impact on the present value of farming incomes P V I for levels lower than CT I = 6.43. Beyond this threshold, the economic loss due to biodiversity becomes more important.
Results

Optimality curves
Optimal public incentives
Rows 2 and 3 of tables 3 and 4 depict the optimal incentives τ cop for crops and τ grass for grasslands with increasing biodiversity goals B lim . When the biodiversity constraint is not active (B lim = 0), the optimal incentive τ * (0) consists in subsidies for both crops and grasslands. The intuition for such a result is that only economic scores matter in that case and thus subsidies, paid with the initial envelope, perform better by directly improving incomes. When the biodiversity constraint becomes active (B lim > 0), a decrease in the cereal subsidies τ cop occurs with the biodiversity objective for both ecological metrics. In particular, for the strongest biodiversity targets, the incentive on crops τ cop becomes a tax. In contrast, the subsidy for extensive grasslands τ grass remains at a high level globally (except for the policy with the most stringent CTI constraint, namely CT I * ). These optimal patterns to satisfy biodiversity objectives globally stress the need to promote extensive grassland at the expense of crops. According to the selected ecological indicator, this pattern is more or less emphasized.
Impact of the constraints
The rows 4 and 5 of tables 3 and 4 focus on the constraints. They display the gap 10 between the obtained performances on Bal and Biod and the related bounds Budg lim and B lim . It turns out that the gap for the ecological constraint is close to 0 while the one for the financial constraint is strongly positive. This points out that the biodiversity constraint is binding while the budgetary constraint is not binding at each time t, yielding some room of manoeuvre in terms of public budget. In other words, when the biodiversity target increases, stronger changes in optimal land uses are required, including mainly the devlopment of grasslands at the expense of croplands as shown by the optimal incentives in tables 3 and 4. In the context of rigidity and inertia captured by constraint (6) at farmer scale, these optimal land uses changes require longer time to be implemented and achieved. In that context, the annual budgetary constraint is only saturated at a specific year t lim which depends on the biodiversity goal B lim . The row 6 of tables 3 and 4 highlights how the saturation for the budgetary constraint occurs later when the biodiversity goal increases. More globally, the public expenditure Bal * (t) is smaller and thus more distant from the budget limit Budg lim with a more demanding biodiversity target B lim , as depicted by the values of ∆Budg in tables 3 and 4.
To go further, the impact of the ecological constraint on the optimal incentives is detailed on the rows 7 and 8 of the tables 3 and 4. Thus, a sensitivity analysis is given with an approximation of the derivatives of optimal incentives τ * cop and τ * grass with respect to B lim . More specifically are computed the variation rates 11 of τ * with a numerical precision at 10 −2 . We observe that the derivatives of τ * cop are negative while the derivatives of τ * grass equal 0. This stresses that the budget distributed to grasslands remains stable whereas the budget dedicated to crops decreases with the biodiversity target. In other words, the increase of the biodiversity constraint generates a public budget gain due to the decrease of the incentives devoted to crops. Figure 3 illustrates the proportions of utilized agricultural area dedicated to the extensive grassland systems for the three extreme policies: the optimal policy τ * (0) without a biodiversity requirement in figure 3(a) , the optimal policy τ * (F BI * ) providing the best FBI score in figure 3(b) and the optimal policy τ * (CT I * ) associated with the best CTI performance in figure 3(c) . In line with the optimal incentives examined previously, the optimal strategy τ * (F BI * ) mixing high subsidies on grassland and high taxes on crops promotes grassland 10 ∆Budg = through an increase of SAR with extensive grassland proportions as compared to the situation without a biodiversity constraint. As regards the optimal policy τ * (CT I * ) combining moderate subsidies on grassland and low taxes on crops, it favors mixed land-uses with moderate grassland proportions (in blue) as compared to the τ * (0) option. Figure 4 plots the global social costs SoC(B lim ) by detailing the public P uC(B lim ) and the private P rC(B lim ) costs for the different optimal public strategies. Figure 4 first highlights the fact that the private cost (dashed blue lines) increases while the public cost (dotted-dashed red lines) decreases. The fact that biodiversity requirements are detrimental to private costs derives from the optimality curves mentioned above in subsection 4.1 where optimal present value of aggregate net farm income is reduced by biodiversity constraints. In contrast, it turns out that public costs are restricted with biodiversity objectives because the agricultural budget balance is improved accordingly. These opposite effects on private and public costs are mainly due to the reduction of subsidies or the presence of taxes on crops τ * cop < 0 in the optimal policies when the biodiversity goal is more demanding, as captured by tables 3 and 4. In other words, taxes are good for the public budget while they alter private incomes, as expected. As regards the total social cost (solid black lines), of interest is the fact that it remains rather flat. This suggests that biodiversity requirements do not necessarily penalize the total social costs. The FBI and CTI patterns are qualitatively close in this sense, although a slight decrease of social costs occurs for the highest CTI constraints. ) policies. It turns out that the regional social total costs remain stable among the optimal policies confirming the result obtained at the macro scale. In other words, the biodiversity constraint does not affect the social cost, even at the more micro level. However, it can be noted that this social cost differs between regions. Figure 6 presents the distribution of the regional total social costs SoC r (B lim ) between the regional public costs 13 P uC r (B lim ) (in red) and the regional private
Optimal land-uses
National costs
Regional costs
costs 14 P rC r (B lim ) (in blue). From equation (14), there is no private biodiversity costs for the economic oriented policy τ * (0). We therefore start directly with the τ * policies with two medium B lim for each indicator. Pink represents negative public costs, where taxes exceed subsidies. Pale blue is associated with negative private costs, i.e. the regional farmer income is larger than under the τ * (0) policy without a biodiversity requirement. Moreover, strong grey (pale grey, white resp.) regions have very stationary (intermediary stationary, unstable resp.) costs among the optimal strategies.
Although the policies affect the regions differently, the patterns are qualitatively similar in every region and for the two indicators: when the biodiversity constraint is more stringent, the public cost decreases and the private cost increases as already captured by Figure 4 . As also suggested by figure 4, there is a strong complementarity between the two costs: regions where the public cost decreases strongly are those where the private cost grows strongly. Typically, the four regions in white in figure 6 (Ile de France, Centre, Picardie, Champagne-Ardennes), which have a historically strong specialization in arable lands, are the most affected by "green" policies. Hence, for the strongest biodiversity targets, they generate an important public gain with taxes on crops.
Discussion
The bio-economic trade-off
The bio-economic model developed in this study leads to the design of optimal policies with respect to budgetary and biodiversity constraints. The optimal strategies maximize the national intertemporal farming income (or equivalently minimize the national private cost) under a biodiversity target with a fixed financial budget. The analysis of the optimal policies with different objectives of biodiversity provides bio-economic optimality curves. For the tested biodiversity indicators, the bio-economic trade-off is strictly negative, suggesting that integrating biodiversity goals in agricultural policies entails a loss of earnings for farmers. This result is strongly consistent with the literature as in Polasky et al. (2005) , Drechsler et al. (2007) , Lewis et al. (2011 ), Barraquand & Martinet (2011 , and thus constitutes another illustration of the antagonism between economic and ecological performances in agricultural public policies.
However, our study brings new insights to this debate. The first one is that the shape of the bio-economic trade-off depends on the selected indicator, and the strictly concave form cannot be generalized as the standard shape. In particular, contrary to most curves displayed in the literature (Drechsler et al. 2007 , Polasky et al. 2008 2005) , the optimality curve for the Farmland Bird Index does not display a clear concave behavior. The FBI relies on the specialist species. Because the grassland specialist species are particularly sensitive, the
increase of grasslands at the expense of croplands underlying the optimal policy (as shown by the map 3(b)) globally foster the FBI (as shown by the map 3(b)). However the increase is not regular because some species involved in the FBI as the skylark are specialist of crops. The Community Trophic Index does not behave in the same way. The improvement of CTI indeed requires a relative heterogeneity of farming land-uses (as highlighted by the map 3(c)) because the CTI favors high level trophic species among which many enjoy both grasslands and crops (Mouysset et al. 2012) . Typically, the species with the highest trophic levels are the Buzzard, the Kestrel, the Red-backed Shrike and the Hoopoe. Among them, only the third is specialized in grasslands. Therefore, the optimal management with the CTI score implies more mixed land-uses or public incentives as compared to public policies involving FBI.
The diversity of optimality curves and underlying trade-offs highlights the difficulty of selecting a single policy among the optimal ones. This outcome is important for decision-makers, especially since the FBI indicator, which does not fit with the strictly concave case, is currently the one which has been adopted by the European Community as the official environmental index (Balmford et al. 2003) . In contrast to concave trade-off, there is here no "balanced" choice. In the concave case, balanced choice lies at the corner of concavity, where it is not possible to moderately improve the biodiversity indicator without implying strong private costs for farming (Polasky et al. 2005 , Lewis et al. 2011 , Barraquand & Martinet 2011 . Our context of multiple forms of trade-offs and the lack of a clear balanced choice suggests the adoption in future works of a multi-criteria approach to simultaneously account for the numerous facets and metrics of biodiversity.
Benefits of policies with biodiversity goals
The first benefit of policies with biodiversity goals is obviously the improvement of biodiversity performance. But public and social costs give insight into a second benefit. First, it turns out that the social cost does not rise in response to biodiversity requirements. This suggests that biodiversity is not detrimental to overall (macro) economic performance. Second, such an assertion is reinforced by the study of public cost. We observe that, for both biodiversity indicators, the increase in biodiversity objectives leads to a decrease in the agricultural public budget. In other words, the policies with demanding biodiversity goals entail a budgetary benefit. The increase of biodiversity target needs stronger changes in land-uses, in particular development of grasslands at the expense of croplands. The optimal land uses require longer time to be achieved and yield gains in term of public expenditure. Therefore, it is possible to improve biodiversity performances while strengthening the budget balance. The stability of social costs also shows bio-economic synergies since it seems possible to improve biodiversity scores with similar social costs. This paves the way for an alternative (apart from ecosystem services) to the trade-off broadly emphasized in the literature between biodiversity and economic performance (Polasky et al. 2005 , Drechsler et al. 2007 , Lewis et al. 2011 , Barraquand & Martinet 2011 .
These effects are mainly implied by the taxes on crops in the optimal policies with biodiversity objectives. Understanding the role of taxes is not a straightforward affair because in the decision-making program which maximizes the present value of aggregate net farm income, subsidies should be preferred to taxes as they directly enhance the revenues. In fact, the use of taxes on crops in the optimal policies arises from the necessity to extensively develop grasslands at the expense of crops to comply with demanding ecological constraints. This emphasizes the importance of combining tools (taxes and subsidies) and levers (grasslands and croplands) to deal effectively with such a heterogeneous bio-economic system: heterogeneity in economic contexts (different profitability for land-uses among the regions), heterogeneity in biodiversity states (heterogeneity of land-use reactions of species according to the regions, heterogeneity of impacts of land-uses on population dynamics according to the initial states).
However it is well known that these taxes raise questions in terms of acceptability. At this stage, a first argument is that according to the structure of the economic data which implicitly includes current public policies, taxes on croplands in this model can be more interpreted as a reduction of the current subsidies on croplands. Second, because the objective of such public policies is to financially support farmers to fulfill the biodiversity constraint, this budgetary benefit could be redistributed to farmers in a second mechanism in order to compensate their loss of income. By reducing these private costs, their acceptability for adopting biodiversity goals in agricultural policies should be enhanced. However, this financial redistribution of the public gain questions equity between agents, or the spatial scale of redistribution. The regional analysis of the different costs provides a first insight into the second benefit redistribution. Indeed, the study shows that the stability of the total cost with respect to the biodiversity target also holds true at the regional scale. The policies do not affect all the regions with the same intensity but a gain between public and private costs is obtained for each region. As the regions with private losses are also those where the public cost decreases, a first redistribution mechanism could be tested at the regional scale. The budgetary benefit could be also distributed to other sets of land-uses regarding to other environmental issues (erosion, water pollution ...).
Perspectives
The objective of this study is to examine the role played by biodiversity goals on agricultural policies and symmetrically to help conservation biology to take socio-economic issues into account. In this vein, ecological-economic modeling is a fruitful framework to bring together social and natural sciences in order to tackle biodiversity management issues (Cooke et al. 2009 ) especially within an agro-ecological and terrestrial context. By stylizing the agro-ecological system, this kind of modeling leads to both improvements in understanding and reinforcement of decision-making supports by fostering policy effectiveness (Mouysset et al. 2011b) . The integration of dynamics and spatialization of the processes reinforces their relevance. Moreover, the relative simplicity of the bio-economic mechanisms underlying the model together with its multi-scale perspective should make it easily transferable to other case-studies and other biodiversity taxa.
The results presented in this paper should, however, be viewed as suggestive rather than predictive elements. Some improvements could have a positive impact on the design of relevant policies and should be integrated into future developments. The ecological dynamics could be refined by considering interactions both between species and between regions with meta-population models (Ferrière et al. 1996) . In this perspective, taking into account more explicit spatial processes within the bio-economic model should reinforce the derived assertions. For example, accounting for the level of landscape fragmentation which affects both biodiversity dynamics (Tscharntke et al. 2005) and agricultural land-use policies (Hartig & Drechsler 2009 , Polasky et al. 2008 ) should be a major task. The use of other biodiversity metrics together with multi-criteria approaches should also strengthen the statements. In particular paying attention to ecosystem services (MEA 2005) should expand biodiversity benefits and synergies between economic and ecological performances. From the economic point of view, it would be accurate to account for more macro-economic processes and price mechanisms. Typically, future rents of agricultural activities can vary according to the influence of fuel prices or technical progress. In line with this, a relevant objective would consist in expanding the myopic behaviors of farmers into optimal intertemporal strategies. The role played by transaction costs for the implementation of taxes should also be investigated. Explore the role played by some other land-uses, chosen in consistence with the new priorities of the CAP, could also constitute an interesting development. Finally, allowing for dynamic incentives instead of fixed incentives could be a relevant way to improve the effectiveness of agricultural strategies as in Hartig & Drechsler (2009) . In parallel to these developments, it could be interesting to confront this work about present value of agricultural income (which consistent with the specific context of the European agricultural policy) to a more classical approach. For instance, we could study the optimal land-use distribution under an economically sound objective function excluding public incentives. This would be to maximize biodiversity subject to a constraint on social cost 15 , or to minimize social cost subject to a minimum constraint on biodiversity 16 . Figure 6: Regional public P uCr(B lim ) (in red) and private P rCr(B lim ) (in blue) costs under several biodiversity targets B lim . Pink stands for negative public costs and pale blue negative private costs. Grey (resp. pale grey, white) regions present stable (resp. intermediary stable, instable) costs. Table 3 : Optimal results, binding levels of constraints and sensitivity analysis associated to different biodiversity targets B lim based on FBI. The first row presents the optimal present values of aggregate net farm income P V I * . The last two rows stand for the optimal cereal τ * cop and grassland τ * grass incentives. The rows 4 and 5 measure the binding level of the budget and biodiversity constraints, ∆Budg and ∆Biod respectively. The row 6 presents the time t lim when the budgetary constraint is saturated. Finally the last two rows present the signs of the derivatives of τ * related to B lim (∆τ * cop and ∆τ * grass ).
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CT Table 4 : Optimal results, binding levels of constraints and sensitivity analysis associated to different biodiversity targets B lim based on CTI. The first row presents the optimal present values of aggregate net farm income P V I * . The last two rows stand for the optimal cereal τ * cop and grassland τ * grass incentives. The rows 4 and 5 measure the binding level of the budget and biodiversity constraints, ∆Budg and ∆Biod respectively. The row 6 presents the time t lim when the budgetary constraint is saturated. Finally the last two rows present the signs of the derivatives of τ * related to B lim (∆τ * cop and ∆τ * grass ).
